A feat of arms and gallantry probably unsurpassed in the glorious history of the British Army' was the description by the Chief of Defence Staff of the decisive victory at Goose Green in 1982 during the Falklands War. How true a picture does this statement give? Spencer Fitz-Gibbon's detailed examination explodes some of the myths surrounding the battle and the part played in it by Colonel H. Jones, V.C. The book explains how the system of tactical command known as 'restrictive control' nearly led to defeat rather than victory, and that it was the death of Colonel Jones and the resulting switch to the alternative 'directive command' style that enabled the British to win the day. This fascinating and important book - required reading for anyone with a serious interest in warfare, organisation studies, and management generally, as well as those concerned about history becomes distorted - shows how important lessons have been ignored as a result of inaccurate reporting and unquestioning glorification of the British performance. The Author: Spencer Fitz-Gibbon's book grew out of his Ph.D. thesis 'Tactics, Command and Military Culture: A Study of 2 Para at Darwin-Goose Green'. He has published many articles on military theory and tactics.